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‘These English psychologists,’ Nietzsche wrote in 1887, ‘just what do they want?’
You always find them at the same task, whether 
they want to or not, pushing the partie honteuse 
of our inner world to the foreground, and 
looking for what is really effective, guiding 
and decisive for our development where 
man’s intellectual pride would least wish to 
find it (for example, in the vis inertiae of habit, 
or in forgetfulness, or in a blind and random 
coupling and mechanism of ideas, or in 
something purely passive, automatic, reflex-
ive, molecular and thoroughly stupid) – what 
is it that actually drives these psychologists in 
precisely this direction all the time?  
Nietzsche’s complaint is not that morality 
should be protected from explanation – this 
passage opens On the Genealogy of Morality – 
but rather that the ‘English psycholog ists’ 
appear to be driven by self-loathing. Under 
the cover of cool empiricism lies a ‘secret, 
malicious . . . instinct to belittle humans’, 
or a disillusioned idealism, or maybe just ‘a 
bit of everything, a bit of vulgarity, a bit of 
gloominess, a bit of host ility to Christian-
ity, a little thrill, and a need for pepper’.
Nietzsche would no doubt have been just 
as wary of those today who look for the 
ultimate explanation of morality – not to 
mention love, sex, religion and art – in brain 
scans and evolutionary just-so stories. ‘It is 
increasingly evident that moral stand ards, 
practices and policies reside in our neuro-
biology,’ the ‘neurophilosopher’ Patricia 
Churchland claims. ‘Our moral nature is 
what it is because our brains are as they 
are.’ Steven Pinker writes that the ‘human 
moral sense turns out to be an organ . . . with 
quirks that reflect its evolutionary history 
and its neurobiological foundations.’ Thus 
Daniel Dennett feels able to claim that Dar-
winism is a ‘universal acid’ that ‘eats through 
just about every concept, and leaves in 
its wake a revolutionised worldview’. Some 
neuro-evo evangelists, especially those writ-
ing for a mass audience, take themselves 
not only to be explaining morality, but to be 
explaining it away. All talk of persons and 
character, just and unjust, the very idea of 
moral reasoning, should be given up: we 
must speak now only of brains, hard-wired 
through natural selection to serve the inter-
ests of selfish genes. John Gray declares that 
morality is a ‘myth’ obscuring the fact that 
our existence has ‘no more meaning than 
the life of a slime mould’. David Brooks, 
author of the bestselling pop-science Bil-
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dungsroman The Social Animal, explains that 
his fictional everywoman ‘Erica’ is slow to 
trust ‘Harold’ because ‘while Pleistocene 
men could pick their mates on the basis of 
fertility cues discernible at a glance, Pleisto-
cene women faced a more vexing problem,’ 
since they had to choose a man ‘not only for 
insemination but for continued support’.
The widespread belief that scientific ex-
planation replaces morality and moral talk – 
and its corollary, that science must be re-
jected if morality is to be saved – labours 
under a confusion. Consider the question: 
‘Why does Sarah believe that it’s good to 
keep promises?’ It can be answered in two 
ways: by giving a causal explanation of Sar-
ah’s belief, or by listing the considerations 
Sarah might reasonably cite in support of 
her belief. When we answer the question in 
the first way – for example, by saying some-
thing about the evolutionary origins of 
promising – we inhabit the world of cause 
and effect. When we answer it in the sec-
ond way – for example, by talking about the 
special duties that are incurred when one 
makes a promise – we inhabit what Wilfrid 
Sellars called the ‘space of reasons’. The 
mistake is to think that living in a world of 
causes precludes our also inhabiting the 
space of reasons. We are indeed creatures 
of cause, living within and as part of the 
natural order; but at the same time we are 
creatures of reason. Our capacity to justify 
ourselves to each other, to persuade with-
out coercion, is constitutive of our person-
hood, and as important for the scientist as 
for anyone else.
In The Ethical Project, Philip Kitcher at-
tempts to show that there is adequate room 
for moral reasons in a causal world. As a 
philosopher and historian of science, Kitch-
er is wedded to Naturalism, the doctrine 
that philosophy should posit nothing that 
cannot be found in our best science. Like 
many Naturalists, he is convinced of the 
power of Darwinian theory to explain not 
only biological but also cultural develop-
ment, and wants to draw on it to elucidate 
morality. But he is also a humanist – he has 
written in the past about political philo-
sophy, the history of early modern philo-
sophy, and the aesthetics of Wagner and 
Joyce – and wants to do justice to the text-
ure of our moral lives. His goal is to provide 
a meta-ethics – an account of the nature of 
ethical truth – that respects the demands of 
both Naturalism and humanism. This isn’t 
an easy thing to do. Most attempts to re-
concile ethics with evolutionary theory 
offend against humanism by equating what 
is morally good for persons with what is 
evolutionarily adaptive for organisms – a 
mistake Kitcher himself criticised in Vault-
ing Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for 
Human Nature (1985). 
Kitcher’s attempt to devise a scientific-
ally and philosophically cogent meta-ethics 
draws inspiration from Pragmatism, the 
American philosophical tradition developed 
by William James, C.S. Peirce and John 
Dewey. Pragmatists urged philosophers, 
and culture as a whole, to let go of their pre-
occupation with truth. Do not ask whether 
beliefs or theories are true, they suggested, 
but whether they are useful. Truth is a sec-
ondary matter; progress, understood as the 
more efficient satisfaction of human needs, 
is the fundamental concern. What makes a 
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given belief true, according to Pragmatism, 
is that it survives progressive transitions in 
human development, proving itself useful 
before the court of history. Kitcher augments 
Pragmatism with the conceptual apparatus 
of 21st-century evolutionary theory, and 
then applies it specifically to ethics. The 
result is a view according to which ethical 
beliefs are true if they survive the course of 
human evolutionary and cultural develop-
ment. Moral truths evolve along with us, and 
because of us: the space of reasons is an 
evolutionary product of the world of causes.
Kitcher’s case for this view, which he 
calls Pragmatic Naturalism, begins with our 
early hominid ancestors roaming the sav-
annah fifty thousand years ago. He argues 
that psychological altruism – acting in the 
interest of another, in virtue of its being in 
the other’s interest to do so – evolved as an 
adaptation that allowed our ancestors, like 
present-day bonobos and chimpanzees, to 
live in co-operative communities.* (This may 
seem obvious, but many evolutionary theor-
ists insist that displays of altruism among 
our primate cousins are really just instances 
of Machiavellian self-interest. Some of these 
theorists like to argue that the same goes 
for humans.) However, our ancestors’ altru-
ism had its limits. There was always a 
temptation to cheat or defect when the pay-
off was big enough. Resulting snags in the 
social fabric had to be repaired through 
painstaking sessions of mutual grooming. 
(Chimpanzees spend up to six hours a day 
huddled together in moments of group 
stress.) A new psychological adaptation was 
needed, which Kitcher calls ‘the capacity 
for normative guidance’. This allowed our 
ancestors – unlike our primate cousins – to 
check the selfish dispositions that interfere 
with altruism, first through the fear of soc-
ially regulated punishment, then through 
more refined mechanisms like respect for 
authority (including divine authority), the 
setting up of moral exemplars – saints, 
heroes and the like – and, ultimately, fully- 
fledged moral codes transmitted through 
language and social institutions. The moral 
truths, according to Kitcher, are those be-
liefs, for example in the importance of 
keeping promises, that both resulted from 
and made possible this progress towards 
increased social harmony.
In evolutionary accounts of human psych-
ology, much hangs on how strong we take 
the connection between ourselves and our 
prehistoric ancestors to be. Once it is con-
ceded that we are far more complex creat-
ures than they were, and that culture is not 
exhaustively determined by biology – Kitch-
er insists on both things – it’s reasonable to 
ask what we stand to learn from evolution-
ary history. Can our contemporary moral 
concerns – the trade-offs between liberty 
and security; the injustices of global capit-
alism; clashes of values and beliefs; the 
negotiation of desire; the formation of ident-
ity – really be said to resemble anything 
that went on in the savannah fifty thousand 
years ago? And if our problems are essent-
ially different from those of our ancestors, 
why should we care what innovations they 
came up with to solve theirs? They would 
presumably be in no better position to deal 
with climate change or gender politics than 
chimpanzees are today.
Anticipating this worry, Kitcher proposes 
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that we think of ethics as a technology we 
have inherited from our hominid ancest-
ors. Technologies are refined over time the 
better to discharge their original function. 
In the process, new problems arise, whose 
solution requires further refinement of 
the technology, which turns up more new 
problems, and so on. Ethics, Kitcher argues, 
was invented as a technology to overcome 
failures of altruism, but as it was refined, 
new problems – new desires, new sources 
of social tension – arose, which themselves 
required further ethical refinement. It is 
this dialectical process, which Kitcher calls 
the ‘ethical project’, that links our contemp-
orary ethical concerns, however distantly, 
with those of our hominid ancestors.
Kitcher ends his book by proposing that 
a much needed renewal of the ethical pro-
ject could be achieved by emulating its earl-
iest phases, when, as he pictures it, bands 
of our ancestors gathered together in the 
‘long cool hour’ to work out how best to get 
along, without deferring to the supposed 
moral authority of priests or philosophers. 
The primordial goal of ethics – overcoming 
failures of altruism in order to ease social 
tension – is not, Kitcher thinks, being 
adequately met in contemporary societies. 
Pov erty and inequality are allowed to per-
sist because of our attachment to moral 
codes and institutions that we should treat 
not as immutable, but as provisional sol-
utions to social problems – solutions that 
can now be seen to have failed. What is 
needed is a renewed attention to the orig-
inal function of ethics, and a return to 
the deliberative principles used, if his hypo-
thesis is right, by the early hominids, but 
adapted to facilitate the participation of 
everyone in the global community. Kitch-
er’s is a utopian vision according to which 
everyone would enjoy not only material 
equality but also an equal opportunity to 
contribute to the ethical project.
In its insistence that ethics is creat-ed  rather than discovered, Pragmatic Naturalism is directly at odds with 
Moral Realism, the ascendant meta-ethical 
view among contemporary philosophers. 
Realists maintain that there are universal, 
timeless, mind-independent truths about 
what is right and what is wrong. In no 
sense is ethics ‘up to us’. Kitcher, like most 
Nat uralists, thinks that a commonsensical, 
scient ifically informed worldview rules out 
Realism. Clearly, there is no place for trans-
cendent moral facts in a world of blind 
particles and brute forces. To hold other-
wise, as the Realist does, is to traffic in 
suspect metaphysics, perhaps to indulge 
nostalgia for an exiled God.
In bringing these charges, however, 
Kitcher hasn’t been watching his oppon-
ents closely enough. The most prominent 
defenders of Realism today – Thomas Nagel, 
T.M. Scanlon, Ronald Dworkin and Derek 
Parfit – explicitly deny that Realism carries 
the heavy metaphysical burden Kitcher is 
worried about. According to the Naturalist, 
all genuine truths correspond to states of 
affairs of the spatio-temporal world. Ethic-
al statements like ‘keeping one’s promises 
is good’ either reduce to such states, or 
they aren’t true. The New Realists reject 
this opposition. Of course, some truths – 
like ‘Mount Kilimanjaro is a dormant volc-
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ano’ – correspond to states describable by 
science. Others – ‘two plus two is four,’ ‘the 
world financial markets collapsed in 2008’ 
or ‘Agamemnon’s downfall was his pride’ – 
are not (obviously) reducible to such states, 
yet seem to be true nonetheless. So too with 
ethical statements: they can be true with-
out corresponding to any fact ‘out there’, 
either in the spatio-temporal universe or in 
some imagined Platonic sphere. The Nat-
uralist’s mistake, the New Realists argue, 
is to think that all truths must finally be 
accounted for in the ledger of science. The 
Naturalists, they believe, are actually the 
ones suffering the theological hangover: 
they yearn to replace God with science.
Even if one remains unconvinced that a 
metaphysically unburdened Realism is ten-
able, there is something compelling about 
the New Realists’ refusal to ground the 
space of reasons in the world of causes. For 
Naturalists, even when they are as sophist-
icated as Kitcher, can sometimes appear to 
be making category errors. Consider Kitch-
er’s account of the emergence of feminism:
What was discovered? Factual knowledge ad-
vanced: people learned that, under different 
conditions of socialisation, women wanted 
things traditionally denied to them; that they 
found satisfaction in attaining some of these 
things; that fulfilment of the wishes did not 
thwart desires previously seen as central to 
female nature – public life combined more or 
less satisfactorily with family life.
This may or may not be a sound account 
of how the feminist movement originated, 
but the point is that Kitcher interprets the 
question ‘Why do we believe that women 
and men have equal rights?’ as a request for 
causal explanation, not as a demand for 
justification. Feminism is justified not be-
cause women want to be treated like men 
and because it so happens that granting 
them equality doesn’t cause too much 
damage to family life: it is justified because 
of the equality of men and women. Simil-
arly, writing about the liberalisation of 
attitudes towards homosexuality, Kitcher 
argues that ‘accepting same-sex preference 
rests on establishing facts about the pre-
valence of homosexual desires and about 
the consequences of expressing them.’ No 
doubt cultural attitudes towards homo-
sexuality have shifted in tandem with the 
greater visibility of gays and lesbians and 
with the deepening of public understanding 
of sexuality. But the question ‘Why should 
we be accepting of homosexuality?’ isn’t 
satisfactorily answered by observing that 
‘homosexual desires are widespread and 
their expression is non-disastrous for soc-
iety.’ Questions about what justifies claims 
of equality, rights and obligations must be 
answered within the space of reasons.
The ambition, central to the Naturalist 
programme, to ground the space of reas-
ons in the world of causes always runs the 
risk of leaving all cause and no reason. But 
this doesn’t mean that we should give up on 
reconciling science and morality. What if, 
instead of the theoretical reconciliation 
which Kitcher and many other philosophers 
chase after, we were to take a more prac-
tical approach? This would involve show-
ing, by example, how to speak in the lang-
uages both of science and of morality, 
without anxiously translating the one into 
the other. In a culture increasingly seduced 
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by scientific discourse, a demonstration of 
such bilingualism would be one of the more 
useful things philosophy has to offer.
Does an unwillingness to re-duce reason to cause require us to be Realists? That is, does it require 
us to believe that ethics is a body of eternal, 
objective, mind-independent truths? Real-
ists, unsurprisingly, say that it does. They 
argue that when we deliberate about eth-
ics, when we seek to justify ourselves and 
convince others, we tacitly adopt a Realist 
framework. When we condemn torture, say, 
we do so as if it were objectively wrong, and 
not wrong just as a matter of taste or con-
vention. Besides, the alternative is unpalat-
able: a world in which the permissibility 
of torture is negotiable is one in which 
nothing is forbidden. The Naturalist’s re-
fusal to go along with the Realist leaves him 
open to the accusation that he has nothing 
to say in the face of moral atrocity. How 
would Kitcher respond to the proposal that 
we might continue the ethical project – that 
is, the easing of social tension – not by over-
coming failures of altruism, but through 
genocide or fascism? If ethics is an adapt-
able technology that we use to deal with 
social instability, isn’t it possible that our 
ethical experiments could lead just as eas-
ily to a dystopia of systematic oppression as 
to Kitcher’s utopian democracy? The worry 
is not that our collective future might turn 
out to be ugly –  no meta-ethical theory, 
Realism included, will stop would-be per-
petrators of evil – but that according to 
Pragmatic Naturalism, evil might turn out 
to be good.
Kitcher tries to defuse this problem by 
arguing that the method he proposes for 
ethical decision-making – that is, mutual 
deliberation – is one that leads to utopian, 
not dystopian outcomes. By contrast, dys-
topian proposals cannot furnish a self- 
reinforcing method of moral adjudication. 
Only such proposals as Kitcher’s – those 
that favour radical equality both of life- 
chances and of participation in ethical 
decision-making – have the coherence nec-
essary for a viable ethics. There are two 
diffi culties here. First, there is no assur-
ance that mutual deliberation will save us 
from dystopian outcomes: fascists are some-
times democratically elected, and fear and 
false consciousness are an effective means 
to produce consensus on bad ideas. Kitcher 
is forced to invoke perfectly rational agents 
making decisions in ideal con ditions, but 
this brings him closer to the Realism he 
wants to reject: if ethical pro gress involves 
pursuing an objective ideal, then ethics is 
not so ‘up to us’ after all. Second, it isn’t 
hard to see that some methods of moral 
decision-making do effectively reinforce a 
dystopian status quo. Deferring to the will 
of the Führer or Dear Leader might not 
enjoy the sophistication of Kitcher’s method 
of mutual engagement, but as a model of 
social coherence it can hardly be faulted.
And yet the question posed by moral evil 
– how to vindicate the intuition that it ex-
ists not as a matter of convention, but as a 
matter of objective truth – might in the end 
be a distraction. For there are other moral 
reasons to favour Kitcher’s view of ethics. 
In his model of collective deliberation, 
moral experts – priests and philosophers – 
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give way to a democracy of ethical decision- 
makers. Those who think that Realism is 
the only morally sound meta-ethics are 
often motivated by the belief that the most 
important thing is to be able to condemn 
atrocities as always and everywhere wrong. 
Anti-Realists prefer to think that people 
are ultimately answerable, not to abstract 
princ iples or divine commands, but to each 
other. We should take this view seriously 
not because it is demanded of us by science, 
but because it is ethically attrac t ive in its 
own right. c
